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Abstract
In this paper we consider IL0, the closed fragment of the basic interpretability logic IL. We show that we
can translate GL1, the one variable fragment of Go¨del-Lo¨b’s provabilty logic GL, into IL0. Invoking a
result on the PSPACE completeness of GL1 we obtain the PSPACE hardness of IL0.
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1 Introduction
For a propositional logic L, the closed fragment –we write L0– of that logic consists
of those theorems of L that do not contain any propositional variables at all. For
various logics, it is known that the closed fragment is a lot easier than the full logic
itself. The simplicity of the closed fragment can be captured by the complexity
class of a decision procedure of theoremhood. Moreover, in all cases where L0 is
known to be simpler than L in this sense, we have a set of normal forms for L0 and
a normal form theorem to the eﬀect that each closed formula can be written in a
unique way as a special combination of normal form formulas.
Perhaps the most canonical example of this phenomenon is classical proposi-
tional logic. Theoremhood in classical propositional logic is known to be co-NP
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complete whereas the closed fragment is decidable in LOG-time. In this case, by
deﬁnition, the only two formulas in normal form are  and ⊥. For various modal
logics the situation is similar but slightly diﬀerent. For the provability logic GL,
theoremhood is known to be a PSPACE complete problem (see [2, Theorem 18.29]),
whereas provability of formulas in the closed fragment is known to be PTIME de-
cidable (see [3, Theorem 9]). Moreover, the normal form theorem ([1, Chapter 7])
states that each formula in the closed fragment is provably equivalent to a Boolean
combination of formulas of the form n⊥ with n ∈ ω.
Interpretability logics arise as natural extensions of GL. The logic GL has only
one modal operator A to capture that “A is provable in some basic theory T”.
Interpretability logics have an additional binary modality A  B to capture that
“the theory T +A interprets the theory T +B”.
These interpretability logics are always deﬁned as some core part IL as deﬁned
below, together with some additional principles. However, as soon as the additional
principles prove some rather weak principle F, the technical details of which are
irrelevant for the moment, then closed interpretability formulas can be expressed
without the modality  and the normal forms are the same as those ofGL: Boolean
combination of formulas of the form n⊥ with n ∈ ω (see [5]). It is good to stress
here that all interpretability logics with some interesting meta-mathematical content
do contain the principle F. For logics below ILF and in particular for IL itself, it is
not known if there exists a natural set of normal forms.
Not for all modal logics it is the case that the L0 is simpler than L. In particular,
it is known that the minimal modal logic K and its closed fragment K0 are both
PSPACE complete (see [3, Corollary 4]). The same also happens for the modal logic
K4 of transitive frames (see also [3]).
We shall see in this paper that the logic IL is like these logics K and K4 in that
also the closed fragment of IL is PSPACE hard thereby settling an open question in
[8] in the negative as to whether the closed fragment allows a nice characterization.
2 Interpretability logics
Interpretability logics have been primarily used to study in a formalized setting the
notion of relativized interpretability which is captured by a binary modal operator
. The phrase pq is to be read as “(T together with the translation of p) interprets
(T together with the translation of q)” for some base theory T . Diﬀerent theories T
prove diﬀerent modal principles to hold. However, all theories that allow for coding
of syntax and thus for formalizing the notion of interpretability do validate some
core logic which is called IL.
2.1 The logic IL
We recall that GL is the normal modal logic with one modality  whose non-logical
axioms are instantiations of the following axiom schemes.
(i) (A → B) → (A → B)
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(ii) (A → A) → A
It is well known that GL proves the transitivity axiom, that is,
A → A.
The logic IL is formulated in a propositional modal logic with two modalities  and
. We shall use the following reading conventions. The strongest binding operators
are ¬ and  followed by ∨ and ∧ which in turn bind stronger than . The weakest
binding connectives are the implications ↔ and →. We shall write ϕ as shorthand
for ¬¬ϕ.
Deﬁnition 2.1 The logic IL is a normal modal logic containing GL whose rules
are Modus Ponens and Necessitation and whose axioms other than all propositional
tautologies are the instances of the following axiom schemes.
J1 (A → B) → AB
J2 (AB) ∧ (B  C) → A C
J3 (A C) ∧ (B  C) → A ∨B  C
J4 AB → (A → B)
J5 AA
It follows from J1 and J4 that  is expressible in terms of  within IL:
IL 	 A ↔ ¬A⊥.
The logic ILF is obtained by adding the axiom F to IL.
F := A → ¬(AA)
This principle can be seen as a natural generalization of Go¨del’s second incomplete-
ness theorem. Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem states that any recursive
theory, whenever consistent, does not prove its own consistency. The principle F
states that any recursive theory, whenever consistent, does not even interpret its
own consistency.
2.2 Semantics for IL
The logic IL allows for natural Kripke semantics where the binary modality  is
modeled by a ternary relation. Rather than working with a ternary relation, we
tend to conceive the semantics for  as a collection of binary relations.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An IL model, also called Veltman-model, is a quadruple
〈W,R, {Sx : x ∈ W},〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds, R is a binary
relation on W that is transitive and conversely well-founded. For each x ∈ W , the
binary relation Sx is transitive and reﬂexive such that moreover
(i) ySxz → xRy ∧ xRz;
(ii) xRyRz → ySxz.
The relation  is a usual forcing relation that can be conceived as a map assigning
to each propositional variable p a subset v(p) of W of the worlds where p holds. We
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write x  p to indicate that x ∈ v(p). The relation  is extended to the set of all
formulae by stipulating that
(i) x  A ⇔ ∀y (xRy → y  A);
(ii) x  AB ⇔ ∀y(xRy ∧ y  A → ∃z(ySxz ∧ z  B)).
It is well-known that IL is sound and complete with respect to the class of all
Veltman models (see [4]).
2.3 Fragments
We shall denote by IL0 the fragment of IL that consists of those modal formulae
provable in IL that contain no propositional variables. Likewise, by GL1 we shall
denote those formulas in the language of GL that contain only one variable and are
theorems of GL.
3 Translating GL1 into IL0
Let p be the variable of GL1. We shall translate this variable to some formula in
the closed fragment of IL that essentially uses the  modality. It is easy to see that
such formulas exist. Examples are given in [8] (Section 5.4) and in [7]. The formula
that we use here is equal to the one exposed in [7].
3.1 Some motivation for our translation
In this section we shall expose a translation that reduces theoremhood of GL1 to
IL0 thereby establishing PSPACE hardness of the latter. The motivation for this
translation is mainly semantical.
We will code the information as to whether p holds or not in a world x by making
the formula    true at x if and only if x  p. To this extent we can glue to
each x two new worlds x1 and x2 with xRx1Rx2 and
4 x2Sxx1 ⇔ x  p. For this,
all the Sx relations in IL are suﬃciently independent. This idea should motivate
why we translate p to  → .
Moreover, with this approach the points that we are interested in, that is, the
original points, become easily deﬁnable by the formula . Thus, when quanti-
fying over points that we are interested in, we should relativize to our old domain.
This explains why we shall translate A to ( → A†) where A† is the trans-
lation of A.
We shall see in Subsection 3.3 that we do not actually need to glue so many
diﬀerent new worlds to code all the behavior of the x 	 p for all x in the model. By
transitivity it suﬃces to add some worlds only at the top of the model.
4 We should add some more Sx relations too on the already existing part of the model. For the motivational
part here, we just focus on the newly added worlds x1 and x2.
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3.2 The translation
We consider the following translation † of formulas of GL1 into formulas of IL0:
(i) ⊥† = ⊥
(ii) p† =  → ()
(iii) (A → B)† = A† → B†
(iv) (A)† = ( → A†)
Lemma 3.1 Let A be a formula of GL that only contains the propositional variable
p. If GL 	 A, then IL 	 A†.
Proof. So, suppose IL 	 A†. Then, there is an IL model M = 〈W,R, {Sx : x ∈
W},〉 and a world w ∈ W such that M, w  A†. Next, we consider the GL model
N = 〈W ′, R′,′〉 deﬁned by:
(i) W ′ := {w} ∪ {x ∈ W : M, x  },
(ii) R′ := R ∩ (W ′ ×W ′),
(iii) x ′ p iﬀ M, x  p† (for every x ∈ W ′).
We point out that the union deﬁning W ′ may be a non-disjoint one. Using the
deﬁnition of N it is straightforward to prove (by induction on the length of the
formula) that for every formula B which only contains the propositional variable p,
N , x ′ B iﬀ M, x  B† (for every x ∈ W ′).
In particular, we get that N , w ′ A. Therefore, GL 	 A. 
Lemma 3.1 is the easier direction of what we shall see is an equivalence. In
particular, the lemma allows for an easy proof-theoretic proof.
Proof. So, suppose GL 	 A. We know that GL has a cut-free proof π (see system
G1 in [6]) which thus satisﬁes the sub-formula property. Consequently, each sequent
in π contains at most the variable p. It is an easy check that proofs only containing
p are preserved under †. 
3.3 Construction on models
In this subsection we shall prove the converse to Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2 Let A be a formula of GL that only contains the propositional variable
p. If IL 	 A†, then GL 	 A.
Proof. By the completeness proofs of IL and GL we know that it is suﬃcient to
show that
∀A [∀IL-modelM M |= A† =⇒ ∀GL-modelN N |= A],
or equivalently
∀A [∃GL-modelN ∃n∈N N , n  A =⇒ ∃IL-modelM∃m∈M M,m  A†].
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To this extent we shall exhibit a transformation on GL models that yields the
desired IL model. Let N := 〈W,R,〉 be a GL-model for some GL-formula A
at most containing the variable p. As GL is complete with respect to ﬁnite tree-
like models we may indeed assume that N has is such a ﬁnite tree-like model.
By E={e1, . . . , el} we denote the set of end-points in N , which is of course ﬁnite.
We consider two disjoint copies of E (which are also disjoint with W ), namely
E = {e1, . . . , el} and E = {e1, . . . , el}. The idea is to ‘glue’ these additional
points ei and e

i as a little R chain of length two above
5 the end-points ei so that
each old point in the model will satisfy .
As R is conversely well-founded it is the case that each x ∈ M is R=-below some
ei (here xR
=y is a shorthand for “xRy ∨ x = y”).
Now, we consider an IL model M = 〈W ′, R′, {S′x : x ∈ W ′}〉 satisfying:
(i) W ′ := W unionmulti E unionmulti E,
(ii) R′ is the transitive closure of R ∪ {(e, e) : e ∈ E} ∪ {(e, e) : e ∈ E},
(iii) S′
e
= {(e, e)} (for every e ∈ E).
(iv) S′
e
= ∅ (for every e ∈ E).
(v) for every x ∈ W it holds that
S′x is the smallest transitive and reﬂexive relation on {y | xR′y} that contains
both Sx and R
′ restricted to {y | xR′y} such that moreover for every e ∈ E,
(e, e) ∈ S′x iﬀ N , x  p and xR=e.
It is very easy to check that there is a unique IL model satisfying these conditions.
We notice that in the deﬁnition of W ′ we have used the symbol unionmulti to emphasize that
these unions are indeed disjoint ones, and we have not introduced a valuation ′ in
M because our purpose is only to evaluate closed formulas (like A†).
First of all we note that in M we can modally deﬁne the old points in N since
{x ∈ W ′ : M, x  } = W . The next step is to prove that for every formula B
which only contains the propositional variable p,
N , x ′ B iﬀ M, x  B† (for every x ∈ W ).
The proof of this claim proceeds by an induction on the length of B.
• For  or ⊥ the claim is vacuous.
• If B = p we have that p† =  →   . By construction, M, x  .
By construction, in any R-successor of x one can go by an Sx transition to some
ei where  holds. Thus, indeed, M, x  .
• On the other hand, if N , x  ¬p, then again M, x  . But in this case we
can go via an R-transition to some ei . By construction there is no Sx-transition
from ei to any point where  holds, whence M, x  .
• The proof of the claim is trivial for both the Boolean connectives and the modal
operator .
5 W.r.t. the R-relation of course.
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Now that the claim is established the lemma follows immediately. 
4 Computational complexity of IL0
First we obtain PSPACE hardness of IL.
4.1 PSPACE hardness
If we combine Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 we see that we have a reduction of GL1
to IL0. That is, for any formula A with at most one variable p we have that
GL 	 A ⇔ IL 	 A†.
As it is known thatGL1 is PSPACE complete (see [3, Theorem 7] and [9]) we obtain
the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 The computational complexity of IL0 is PSPACE hard.
If in addition to this we would know that IL is in PSPACE we would obtain
PSPACE completeness. It is commonly held that indeed the complexity of full IL
is PSPACE-compleet, but up to now nobody has yet proven this. It came as a bit
of a surprise to the authors to ﬁnd out that actually no complexity results in the
ﬁeld of interpretability logics are known. Thus, this short note could well be the
precursor to further investigations in various interpretability logics on very natural
complexity questions in the otherwise mature ﬁeld of interpretability logic.
4.2 On a normal form theorem for IL0
The PSPACE completeness of IL0 does a-priori not exclude the possibility of a
normal form theorem of IL. It is even conceivable that there exists some easily
recognizable class of normal forms for IL0 so that each formula in the language of
IL0 is equivalent to a small sized boolean combination of these normal forms. In
such a case the normal forms themselves may be easy and even easily comparable
but then for an arbitrary formula it still remains hard (PSPACE) to see actually
what combination of normal forms it is provably equivalent to. These observations
render a normal form theorem for IL0 –if it would exist– useless for most practical
purposes.
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